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The Two-acre Exemption Guidelines:
Are They Too Stringent?
INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA)l and the ensuing regulations
promulgated by the United States Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), 2 federal tribunals have
been increasingly burdened by litigation addressing the reasonableness of OSM's authority in implementing the Act. 3 Recently
this judicial scrutiny has focused on OSM regulations redefining4
SMCRA's exemption for mining operations of two acres or less.
This comment will set out the statutory and current regulatory
framework relevant to this exemption and will provide an overview of recent judicial and administrative interpretations of
those guidelines. The pressing question is whether OSM regulations defining this exemption are in fact too stringent in light of
Congressional intent and problems of practical implementation.
I.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEwoRK

In response to what was perceived as inadequate state regulation of coal mining operations,' Congress enacted SMCRA, a
comprehensive federal regulatory program to control the adverse
environmental effects of surface and underground coal development. 6 The Act, which in essence establishes minimum per30 U.S.C. §

1201-1328 (1982).

2 30 C.F.R. Chapter VII (1981).

Cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 456 U.S. 264
(1981); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (OSM interim performance standards held
not violative of constitutional guarantees provided in the fifth and tenth amendments);
In re Permanent Surface Mining Litig., 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (interim blasting

and prime grandfather exception rules struck down as improper expansion of statutory
performance standards); Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1982)
(see infra note 43 and accompanying text).
30 C.F.R. § 700.11(b) (1982).
See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c),(g),(h) (1982).
6 See generally Bratt, Surface Mining in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J. 7 (1982-83); see
also Note, A Summary of the Legislative History of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Relevent PeriodicalLiterature, 81 W. VA. L. RaV.
775 (1978-79).
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formance standards for the extraction of coal in all mines
operated in the United States,7 requires that a permit application
be submitted to the regulatory authority before any mining
operation can commence.' For a mining permit to be issued, the
applicant's permit must satisfy complex technical specifications
concerning the mining operation itself and any postmining consequences associated with the specific site. 9 Compliance with
these detailed requirements results in extensive-and costly surveying, sampling, and engineering analysis in advance of any
mining operation. I0 In addition to complying with these permit
application criteria, the permittee must pay fees upon production
into an Abandoned Mine and Reclamation fund as established
under the Act."
Pursuant to SMCRA's mandate, OSM is designated as the
executive watchdog of the Act's requirements under the direction

7 SMCRA contains 115 performance standards which address every facet
of the
mining process from premining site design and development through postmining reclamation. See 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (1982).
8 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1254 (1982). Under SMCRA, the states may become the
regulatory authority by assuming primacy if OSM ratifies their regulatory program as
being consistent with OSM regulations. If the state program is either disapproved or not
submitted, OSM becomes the regulatory authority.
I Id. at § 1265(b).
10Permit preparation for a 30 acre permit in Eastern Kentucky will typically take
from 6 to 9 months and cost approximately S16,650.00. The average costs break down
as follows:
S 2,750
State and Federal permitting fees and licenses.
S 3,300
Preliminary evaluation and acquisition of existing data-including field evaluation, geologic surveys, preparation of maps
and aerial photos, and preliminary designs.
S 2,950
Field data collection-including surface and groundwater surveys, geologic surveys (drilling and sampling overburden, coal
and soil), land use and vegetation analysis, and pre-blast
surveys.
S 700
Historic and application processing information gathering.
S 2,000
Environmental resources information-compilation of field
data collection results and drafting of requisite maps.
S 7,100
Mining and reclamation plans-including topsoil handling,
blasting, disposal of excess spoil, protection of hydrologic
systems, transportation, and post-mining land use.
S 600
Permit compilation.
$16,650
Approximate total cost,
Interview with Steve Gardner, President of Tri-State Engineering, Lexington, Kentucky.
(Aug. 28, 1984).
1 30 U.S.C. § 1231 (1982). The fund is established to restore land degraded by
mining practices prior to the enactment date of SMCRA (Aug. 3, 1977).
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of the Secretary of the Interior.' 2 Under SMCRA, the Secretary
has the power to supersede state regulation and to issue notices
of violation to operations which are violating the Act. Also, in
extreme cases, the Secretary has the power to issue cessation
orders when the operation either poses an imminent threat to
the public health or safety or when the operator fails to abate
a continuing violation. 3 SMCRA also grants OSM the authority
to establish the guidelines and regulations necessary to implement
the Act. Accordingly, OSM has promulgated regulatory provisions of its own as a vehicle for administration and enforcement
of the federal scheme. 14 The regulations defining SMCRA's exemption for two acre or less mining operations are but a few
examples of the regulatory provisions promulgated by OSM
pursuant to this authority.
II.

TE EXEMPTION DEFINED

According to the Act, the provisions of SMCRA are inapplicable to commercial operations "where the surface mining operation affects two acres or less."' 5 Although the wording of the
exemption appears on its face to be simple and straight-forward,
the language is actually open to a variety of interpretations.
Furthermore, since state legislatures are free to promulgate regulations of their own to control their smaller operations, 6 the
application requirements for exempted areas are inconsistent
from state to state. Generally, however, the performance specifications and ensuing permit costs required by the state regarding

11Id. at § 1211(a),(b),(c),(e).
" Id. at § 701.4(bX2X3).
See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. Chapter VII (1982). These regulations were meant to apply
when a state decides not to submit a program for approval. OSM then no longer acts
as the oversite agency but rather is the regulatory authority.
-3 30 U.S.C. § 1278 (1982) states:
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any of the following
activities:

(1) the extraction of coal by a landowner for his own noncommercial
use from land owned or leased by him;
(2) the extraction of coal for commercial purposes where the surface
mining operation affects two acres or less; and
(3) the extraction of coal as an incidental part of Federal, State or
local government-financed highway or other construction under regulations
established by the regulatory authority.
16See 30 C.F.R. § 720.11 (1982).
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federally exempted operations are substantially less than those
required in the permanent program."
As an aid to implementation of SMCRA, the Secretary
has promulgated regulations which define the two-acre
exemption' s and which contain specific criteria which must
be satisfied before an operation is exempted from the
SMCRA performance standards and the abandoned mine reclamation fees.' 9 Under the Secretary's definition, the requirements of SMCRA do not apply to commercial coal
mines where the surface or reclamation operation, together
with any "related" operation, has or will have an "affected
area" of two acres or less. 20 More specifically, the "affected
area" is defined by OSM as including land or water located
above underground mine workings2' and all access and haulage roads to or from the mining or reclamation operation"
(unless designated as a public road, maintained with public
funds, and having substantial public use).Y Two or more
mines are considered by OSM as "related" if drainage from
both operations flows into the same watershed within five
aerial miles (physically related)2, if the operations are under
common ownership or control (economically related), 2 and if
" See e.g., 405 Ky. ADmw. REas. 1:040 §§ 3-4 (1984). Kentucky regulations
except two acre or less operations from numerous permit specifications under SMCRA
including those which require the operator to (I) submit a transportation plan and map
with the permit detailing the road systems affected by the operations, (2) demonstrate
that the land to be affected is not prime farmland or in the alternative that it will be
adequately reclaimed to meet state specifications, (3) demonstrate that the area affected
will have an adequate postmining land use as dictated by the state, (4) demonstrate how
the removed topsoil is to be segregated, stored, and replaced, (5) monitor surface water
runoff and quality standards, and (6) monitor groundwater runoff and recharge characteristics and quality standards.
-2 30 C.F.R. § 700.11(b) (1982).
19 Id.
0 Id.

- See 30 C.F.R. § 701.5 (definition of "affected" area). This is referred to in the
proposed amendments to 30 C.F.R. § 701.5 as the "shadow" area of a mine. See 47
Fed. Reg. 46 (1982).
- 30 C.F.R. § 700.11 (b)(1) (1982).
- Id. at § 710.5.
- Id. at § 700.11(bX2)(i).
- Id. at § 700.1 l(b)(2Xii). Under this provision, two or more mines are deemed
economically related if they are owned or controlled by the same person, two or more
persons (one of whom controls, is under common control with, or is controlled by the
other), or members of the same family (unless it is found that no business relation exists
between them). Furthermore, "control" means: ownership of 50% or more of the voting
shares of, or general partnership in, and entity; any relationship that gives one person
the ability to direct what the other does; or any relation which gives one person express
or implied authority-to determine the manner in which the coal at the two mines will
be mined, handled, sold, or disposed of. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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they occur within twelve months of each other (temporally
related).26
A literal reading of the Secretary's defining criteria reveals
that the test for relatedness appears very broad. The Secretary
can effectively force adjacent two-acre operations to comply
with the Act's requirements, even though separated by as many
as five aerial miles, by simply demonstrating a physical, economic, and temporal relationship. 27 A single two acre or less
operation is nonetheless subjected to the Act if access or haulage
roads, subsurface disturbance, and/or land or water located
above underground workings comprise greater than two acres
when considered with the actual operation.2 The regulatory
agency, however, must demonstrate all of these relationships
before the acreage from adjacent operations can be lumped
together in the exemption determination.
It is within these boundaries that the controversy materializes. Has the Secretary abused his congressionally mandated
discretion by implementing regulations so broad as to, in effect,
eliminate the exemption, or does the burden of proving disqualification from the exemption in fact rest so heavily on the
regulatory authorities that the exemption becomes available to
operations not intended by the Act? To properly address this
problem, it is important to investigate legislative, judicial, and
administrative interpretations of both the exemption and the
Secretary's defining criteria.
III.

A.

THm

EXEMPTION INTERPRETED

Congressional Intent Versus PracticalImplementation
In granting the exemption, Congress recognized that sub-

jecting individuals or corporations to costly regulatory requirements, particularly when their mining operations were incidental
to their regular businesses, would be manifestly unjust. 29 The
Legislature felt that individual, non-commercial, and extremely

30 C.F.R. § 700.11(b)(2) (1982).
See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
= See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
See S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 97-99 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS. 593.
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localized activities which do not cause significant environmental
damage should be exempted from SMCRA not only for equitable
considerations, but also to relieve the regulatory authority of
undue regulatory burdens." Congress clearly indicated that the
"pick and shovel" operation should not fall victim to the
regulatory burdens imposed by SMCRA.11
Theoretically, the exemption should be hailed as a valuable
method of insulating already economically burdened "family"
operations from a costly and complex statutory scheme. Practically, however, this two-acre loophole has been utilized extensively by both large and small coal operators as a vehicle
for avoiding the SMCRA complexities. 3 2 Not infrequently, large
operators will sublet various parcels of two acres or less to
subsidiary operations to thereby avoid the permitting require33
ments and environmental standards.
In addition, operators will often deed their haul roads to
the county in order to remove that acreage from the exemption
calculation. This has the adverse effect of adding to the county's
road maintenance burden.3 Recognition of these abuses was
acknowledged by OSM as a motivating concern in issuing the
final regulations 3" redefining the limits of the two-acre exemption. 36 These regulations, however, have resulted in several judicial and administrative decisions addressing the reasonableness
of the Secretary's interpretation.
B.

The Federal/State Regulatory Overlap

In Jaward v. Watt, 37 a Virginia mine operator sought a
temporary injunction enjoining the Secretary from enforcing a

See 119 CoNo. Rac. 1368 (1973) (dealing with then § 203 exemptions).

31

Id.

3 Editorial, 2-acre loopholes make mockery of mining law (sic), Lexington HeraldLeader, Nov. 28, 1984, at AI0, col. 1.See also Sam Blankenship, 5 IBSMA 32, 90 ID
174 (1983).
3 Id.
1' See Fetterolf Mining Sales, 4 IBSMA 29 (1982).
" In response to litigation over the permanent regulatory program, OSM reorganized 30 C.F.R. § 700.1 1(b) to reflect more closely congressional intent. See Introduction
to the Proposed Changes to Two-Acre Exemption, 47 Fed. Reg. 47 (1982); see also Save
Our Cumberland Mountains v. Clark, 725 F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (an action brought
against the Secretary claiming that suspension of two-acre rule was arbitrary and capri-

dious).

47 Fed. Reg. 33,424,
33,426 (1982).
"564 F.Supp. 797 (W.D. Va. 1983). Jawardhas since been reversed and remanded
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cessation order issued under SMCRA.38 The operation consisted
of an underground mine with a "faced-up" area of only 1.2
acres. 3 9 On the basis of this acreage, the state of Virginia issued
a two-acre permit, exempting the operation from the Federal
Regulations. 4 0 Disregarding the state's determination, OSM officials subsequently issued a cessation order preventing the operator from mining under the Virginia two-acre permit. OSM
based the cessation order on its contention that more than two
acres were affected by the operation when access roads and
underground disturbance were considered as required under the
Secretary's defining criteria. " No showing was made by OSM
or the state that the operation posed an imminent danger to
the environment or public safety.
After determining jurisdiction to hear the case under
SMCRA,42 the district court granted an injunction prohibiting
the Secretary from issuing cessation orders based on the assumption that an operation with a Virginia two-acre, permit
must be permitted under SMCRA, absent a showing of "serious
harm to the environment."

43

The court recognized the potential

abuses of the exemption, noting that "if two mines are opened
side by side, with a common ownership, workmen, and managers; the operation could be a subterfuge to get around the
two-acre exemption. ' 44 However, the court also expressed the

by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for want of jurisdiction. The lower court's
interpretation of 30 U.S.C § 1276 as giving the district court in which the mining
operation is located jurisdiction to hear federal questions regarding the Secretary's
application of the Act was contrary to the Fourth Circuit's opinion that this was instead
an attack on the regulations themselves and therefore reviewable only in the District
Court for the Dictrict of Columbia under 30 U.S.C. § 1276(aX1). Commonwealth of
Va., ex rel. Dep't of Conservation v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37 (1984).
u See infra note 42. For the purpose of discussion, this comment will address
Jaward soley in terms of its merits.
- The faced-up area encompasses the surface acreage incidental to the underground
operation itself, including stock pile and storage areas, personnel facilities, and the actual
operation itself.
• See VA. CoDE ch. 23 (Supp. 1984).
" Jaward, 564 F. Supp. at 798.
IId.
4 Id. at 802. A consent order and dismissal has since been entered wherein the
Commonwealth of Virginia has agreed to apply to those permits and permit applications
the federal "two-acre" criteria set forth in 30 C.F.R. §§ 700.11. Commonwealth of
Virginia v. Clark, No. 82-0385-B, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Va. January 9, 1985).
- Jaward, 564 F. Supp. at 801
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need for smaller operations in Virginia where "two-acre mines
are leased to small coal companies in the more isolated areas,
usually small hollows and pockets, where large scale mining is
not feasible ... [where] fewer men and less expense will be

involved... and the net result is that this coal can be produced
more inexpensively than coal in larger mines."' ' ' The court
therefore held that the OSM criteria as applied to operations
not posing a threat to the environment were possibly unreasonable, arbitrary, and capriciousA 6
The Jaward opinion hinged on the assumption that the
Virginia regulations which governed two acre or less operations
adequately protected the environment.4 7 This rationale closely
tracks a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case decided two years
prior to Jaward. In Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus,4s the
Secretary issued a notice of violation based on a permanent
program regulation prohibiting mining within 100 feet of a
cemetery.4 9 The Holmes court, in validating the district court's
jurisdiction and thereby remanding," ruled that OSM's regulations which redefined "cemetery" to include private family
burial plots5 1 arbitrarily and capriciously interfered with the
state's power to regulate the mining operation. 2 As in Jaward,
the court felt that the state definition afforded adequate pro-

4S

Id.

4Id. The district court applied the scope of review of agency action as set out in
5 U.S.C. § 706 in addressing the likelihood-of-success criteria for preliminary relief
under 30 U.S.C. § 1276(c). See National Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689,
696 (3rd Cir. 1979) (scope of judicial review of regulations promulgated by the Secretary).
" See supra note 17 and acompanying text.
- 655 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 995 (1982) (White &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
*Holmes, 655 F.2d at 734. See also 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982).
By virtue of the Holmes decision, the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit which has
determined that § 1276(a)(1) does not provide for exclusive review of the Secretary's
regulations in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Furthermore, the court
concluded that there are "serious questions about the propriety" of the rulemaking
actions contained in § 1276(a)(1). Holmes, 655 F.2d at 738. This decision becomes
important with respect to the possible review of the Secretary's two-acre criteria in
circuits taking the Jaward position that judicial review of the regulation must be
conducted in the District of Columbia within 60 days of promulgation. See supra note
37.
" 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1983).
2 Holmes, 655 F.2d at 736. The Ohio Reclamation Board of Review had ruled
that private family burial plots were not a cemetery within the Ohio's definition and
therefore not subject to the 100 foot requirement in 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982).
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tection to the interest involved." In addition, there was no
showing by OSM that the mining operation posed an imminent
threat to the environment or public, a distinction likewise noted
in Jaward.
It would seem that Jaward, in light of the Holmes decision,
offers a strong argument for the proposition that an operation,
though not qualifying for the two-acre exemption by OSM
standards, should nonetheless be exempted from the Act and
subjected only to the state standards if there is no showing of
real or potential environmental or public harm as determined
by the state. This fairly liberal interpretation of the Secretary's
rules, however, contrasts with the very narrow construction
rendered by OSM in a series of administrative opinions.
C.

Administrative Interpretation

Prior to the effective date of the revisions to the Secretary's
defining criteria,5 ' the Interior Board of Surface Mining and
Reclamation Appeals (IBSMA) addressed several disputes regarding the exemption. In an almost cursory fashion the Board
has consistently upheld the Secretary's defining criteria, in the
face of various claims to the exemption. As noted in Sam
Blankenship,55 the Board has interpreted the exemption literally
by applying the general rule that exceptions from remedial
legislation should be narrowly construed.5 Subsequent administrative opinions contruing two-acre regulations indicate that
7
this is a difficult burden to overcome.
As pointed out in Jaward, a recurring controversy arises
over which access or haul roads should be included in the
affected area determination. 5 The Board has resolved these
disputes by applying federal regulations which exclude from the
acreage only those roads maintained with public funds.5 9 As

Holmes, 655 F.2d at 738.
September 1, 1982. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,424 (1982).
" 5 IBSMA 32 (1983).
16 "In construing the scope of exceptions contained in generally remedial legislation
the courts have been firm in applying a strict standard." Id. at 39.
11Id., citing Spokane Inland Empire R.R. v. United States, 241 U.S. 344, 350
(1916); Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. Commission, 286 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1932).
See Virginia Fuels, Inc., 4 IBSMA 185, 89 ID 604 (1982); See also Daniel
Brothers Coal Co., 2 IBSMA 45, 87 ID 138 (1980).
" Jaward, 564 F. Supp. at 801.

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW

& POLICY

[VOL. 1: 141

might be expected, this application has resulted in collusive
attempts between operators and public officials to classify such
roads as property of the municipal or county road system. In
dealing with this abuse, the Board in Fetterolf Mining Sales6 o
held that the mere nominal status of a road as a "public"
road, by virtue of its acceptance by a municipal corporation,
is insufficient to exclude it from the determination of the affected acreage. 61 The Board further qualified the exemption in
Jewells Smokeless Coal Corp.62 by holding that the mere dedication of a road to a county will not disqualify that acreage
from the exemption calculation absent a showing that the actual
public use is more than "nominal" and that the road is maintained with public funds. 63
The Board has also upheld the Secretary's definition of
"physical relatedness." 6 In Mullins and Boiling Contractor,6
the Board held that two adjacent two-acre sites were clearly
related:
because the operator treated them as related, using fill material
from the second site to cover an open pit on the first site,
in a situation where he conducted mining operations on both
sites, where the two sites were no more than 60 feet apart,
and where the sites, taken together, obviously encompassed
more than 2 acres."
Additionally, in Blackwood Fuel Co., Inc.,67 the Board determined that the test for relatedness is independent of state
borders. As a consequence, adjacent mines which are physically"
related, though located in different states, will also be subject
to SMCRA if their accumulated interstate acreage is two acres
or more."

C.F.R. § 710.5 (1984).
IBSMA 29 (1982).
61Id.
at 32.
S4IBSMA 51 (1982).
"Id. at 64.
30 C.F.R. § 700.11(b)(2)(i) (1984).
4 IBSMA 156, 89 ID 475 (1982); see Rhonda Coal Co. Inc., 4 IBSMA 124, 89
ID 460 (1982).
'74 IBSMA at 163.
-3 2 IBSMA 359, 87 ID 579 (1980).
6030
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In criticizing the Secretary's criteria for economic relatedness,
the court in Jaward v. Watt noted that "to blanket all mines
that have interlocking ownership, even where they are several
miles apart, and consider them as one mine in considering the
two-acre exemption calculation may be found unreasonable .... 69 The Board, however, has taken a position contrary

to that articulated in Jaward. While the original draft of the
Secretary's regulations did not contain the test for economic
relatedness, 70 the Board has incorporated an interpretation similar to that adopted by OSM. In Sam Blankenship,71 the Board
verified OSM's determination that the exemption applies exclusively to "operations" and not merely "operators. ' 72 Therefore, as is the case under present OSM regulations, an operator
whose activity affects less than two acres cannot claim the
exemption if he has contracted with the permittee of more than
two acres. 73 It should be noted, however, that the present

regulations require a more detailed showing of economic relation
74
before an operation can be denied entitlement to the exemption.
Therefore, this burden, when coupled with the need to prove
that economic relation, physical relation and temporal relation
exist contemporaneously, makes it very difficult to submit an
application for a two-acre operation which will not comply with
the federal requirements.
CONCLUSION
While the precedential value of Jaward v. Watt may very
well be limited in light of the recent agreed order, the reasoning
incorporated should be carefully scrutinized. The need for reasonable regulation and enforcement of bona fide two-acre operations has been clearly expressed by Congress. Although the
financial burdens imposed by SMCRA are excessive when applied to these smaller operations, the need for enforcement must
be balanced against the reality that the exemption has been
repeatedly abused by large and small operations alike. In a

6Jaward,

564 F. Supp. at 801.

- See 30 C.F.R. § 700.11 (1980).
5S IBSMA 32 (1983).
71Id. at 38.
71Id.
"

at 40.

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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literal sense, the regulations promulgated by the Secretary are
easily sidestepped by operators who simply divide a large operation into parcels of less than two acres.
In order to fulfill the environmental protection purpose of
SMCRA, such activities cannot be allowed to occur. On the
other hand, the regulatory system should not be so rigid that
an exception cannot be made for those instances where the
purpose of SMCRA will not be compromised by the mining
operation. Therefore, the Secretary's criteria should provide for
exempting those two-acre operations which can conclusively
show that they pose no real or potential threat to the environment or to public safety.
Kevin B. Watson

